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Abstract—Wireless networks are increasingly becoming suscepti-
ble to more sophisticated threats. An attacker may spoof the 
identity of legitimate users before implementing more serious 
attacks. Most of the current Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) 
that employ multi-layer approach to help towards mitigating 
network attacks, offer high detection accuracy rate and low 
numbers of false alarms. Dempster-Shafer theory has been used 
with the purpose of combining beliefs of different metric meas-
urements across multiple layers. However, an important step to 
be investigated remains open; this is to find an automatic and 
self-adaptive process of Basic Probability Assignment (BPA). 
This paper describes a novel BPA methodology able to automati-
cally adapt its detection capabilities to the current measured 
characteristics, with a light weight process of generating a base-
line profile of normal utilisation and without intervention from 
the IDS administrator. We have developed a multi-layer based 
application able to classify individual network frames as normal 
or malicious. 
Keywords-Basic probability assignment; Datafusion; Dempster-
Shafer; Multi-layer measurements; Spoofing attacks; WiFi 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
MAC layer spoofing attacks are among the most serious 
threats to wireless networks [1]. There exist numerous attacks, 
ranging from Denial-of-Service (DoS) to session hijacking that 
can be implemented because an attacker may masquerade itself 
as a legal user [2]. In the last few years there has been an in-
creasing interest in using detection methodologies to identify 
spoofing attacks in IEEE 802.11 networks [2, 9, 10]. The im-
plementation of wireless network monitoring tools, such as 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), is fundamental in security 
infrastructures in order to provide another level of defence for 
IEEE 802.11 networks. 
Although there are cases in which an algorithm that utilises 
a single metric approach might give positive results, the true 
status of a network is rarely accurately detectable by examining 
a single metric from one network layer of the TCP/IP stack. As 
many researchers have previously demonstrated [3-5], the 
combined use of multiple metrics from the same or different 
network layers may result in higher detection accuracy rate 
with lower numbers of False Negatives (FN) and False Positive 
(FP). Hence, utilising a multi-layer approach may help towards 
automating the overall process of detecting and mitigating 
wireless network attacks. 
Data fusion can be defined as the process of collecting in-
formation from multiple and heterogeneous sources, and com-
bining them towards obtaining a more accurate final result [5]. 
Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory of evidence is a good candidate 
for this purpose. D-S has been previously used in the intrusion 
detection field to enhance the detection accuracy [5-7]. 
Despite having been proven as a powerful and efficient 
technique, a very important step to be investigated remains 
open in D-S theory. This is to find an automatic and self-
adaptive process of Basic Probability Assignment (BPA), 
based on the measured characteristics of the network. The ma-
jor challenge for applying D-S theory on IDS is to automatical-
ly determine the beliefs from the network measurements [8]. 
There exist multiple ways of assigning probabilities to each of 
the hypotheses in D-S theory, ranging from data mining tech-
niques to empirical approaches. However, few of them could 
be used off-the-shelf without a prior thorough training or fine 
tuning period. 
In this work, we propose a novel BPA methodology able to 
automatically adapt its detection capabilities to the current 
characteristics of the wireless network, without intervention 
from an IDS administrator. We have developed a multi-layer 
based application, written in C language, able to classify net-
work frames as normal or malicious. The proposed method 
only requires a light weight process of generating a baseline 
profile of normal utilisation, in order to generate high intrusion 
detection accuracy and low number of false alarms. 
The aim of our methodology requires the system to be 
computationally low cost, scalable and applicable to other 
wireless technologies. The methodology has been tested with 
two different types of attack, a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) at-
tack at the physical layer and a Deauthentication attack, both 
requiring the prior spoofing of a legal user identity. 
The paper is organised as follows. In section II, the most 
relevant work is reviewed. A brief description of the D-S is 
presented in section III. In section IV, the proposed algorithms 
for belief assignment are explained. The methodology, testbed, 
and attack scenarios are presented in section V. In section VI, 
the obtained results are discussed. Finally, conclusions are giv-
en in section VII. 
II. RELATED WORK 
The application of D-S theory for improving the perfor-
mance of IDSs is a very active research topic. One of the most 
thorough descriptions of D-S is presented in [12]. The authors 
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present a comparative study between D-S theory and Bayesian 
inference as data fusion algorithms. In [4], the authors describe 
a cross-layer methodology to increase the performance of an 
anomaly IDS, detecting DoS attacks. Similar to our work, they 
use a sliding window scheme and compare the efficiency of a 
cross-layer approach against a single layer approach. However, 
the data fusion is not carried out using D-S theory. The above 
work uses real WiFi traffic. 
In [5], the authors present a prototype for Distributed DoS 
detection over wired link, based on D-S theory. The system, 
periodically, fuses the knowledge collected from different sen-
sors within the network, in order to infer the current state of the 
monitored network. 
The authors in [7] present and evaluate an IDS for detecting 
DoS attacks by seeking changes in a single metric, the Signal-
to-Noise Ratio. The authors use the D-S theory to fuse the in-
formation from distinct nodes running two different local algo-
rithms, Single Threshold and Cumulative sum. The experi-
ments in this work were also carried out in a real IEEE 802.11 
testbed. 
Among all the works on IDS that investigate the use of D-S 
theory, there exist multiple ways of assigning probabilities to 
each of the hypotheses. For instance, [18] utilises expert opin-
ion to manually assign the belief probabilities. This BPA pro-
cess is completely subjective and might not be adequate for 
automatic and self-adaptive IDSs. 
Another example, [13] proposes two different ways of as-
signing belief probabilities, for two different datasets. In the 
first case, their method calculates a threshold based on the 
length of the dataset, and then utilises that threshold and fixed 
functions to assign the belief probabilities. In the second case, a 
scaled approach with pre-defined beliefs is used. 
The authors in [5] express the BPA as three simple and 
fixed functions. Again, the BPA process is based on previous 
experiments and subjectivity of the IDS administrator. As the 
three functions have a fixed shape, this method might be inad-
equate for automatic and self-adaptive IDSs. 
The methodology employed by [8] uses data mining tech-
niques to proceed with the BPA tasks. The use of data mining 
techniques mostly focuses on processing large amounts of audit 
data traffic rather than performing real-time detection. 
The authors in [7] seek changes in the SNR. The value of 
this metric is measured over both a small time window and a 
large time window. Based on the measured metrics in each 
time window, their system generates the BPAs through the use 
of a linear function. 
From the presented results, all of these methods are effec-
tive in increasing the detection rate and reducing the number of 
false alarms of the IDSs. However, none of the referred works 
investigate methods to find an automatic and self-adaptive pro-
cess of BPA, and few of them could be used off-the-shelf with-
out a previous training or fine tuning period. 
On one hand, systems that make use of data mining tech-
niques for BPA require the gathering of large amounts of data 
traffic, processing it and complete a training period before be-
ing able to perform intrusion detection tasks. These systems are 
unable to automatically adapt to changes in the network traffic 
behaviour in real-time. On the other hand, systems which have 
been empirically assigned fixed probability values by the IDS 
administrator, or systems that employ fixed functions to assign 
the belief probabilities are unable to automatically adjust to 
changes in the network traffic behaviour, without the interven-
tion of the IDS administrator. 
In this work, we propose a network-based anomaly detec-
tion system, which uses a novel statistical-based BPA assign-
ment scheme methodology able to automatically adapt its de-
tection capabilities to the current characteristics of the different 
metrics of the wireless network, without intervention for an 
IDS administrator. 
III. DEMPSTER-SHAFER THEORY 
D-S theory of evidence is a mathematical discipline that 
combines evidence of information from multiple and heteroge-
neous events in order to calculate the belief of occurrence of 
another event. We have presented a more detailed description 
of D-S theory in our previous work [11], along with a compre-
hensible practical example of D-S. 
D-S starts by assuming a Frame of Discernment Θ = {θ1, θ2,..., θn}, the finite set of all possible mutually exclusive prop-
ositions about some problem domain. With regards to this 
work, the frame of discernment is comprised of A = Attack and 
N = Normal. Assuming Θ has two outcomes {A, N}, the total 
number of subsets of Θ, defined by the number of hypotheses 
that it composes, is 2Θ = {A, N, {A|N}, Ø}. 
Each hypothesis from Θ receives from an observer a proba-
bility or belief within [0, 1]. This is known as the Basic Proba-
bility Assignment (BPA). The function ݉	ሺܣሻ is defined as A’s 
basic probability number. It describes the measure of belief that 
is committed exactly to hypothesis A. 
Let ݉ଵ and ݉ଶ be the BPAs from observer 1 and 2 respec-
tively. Their orthogonal ݏݑ݉,݉ ൌ ݉ଵ⨁݉ଶ, is called Demp-
ster’s rule of combination, and is defined as 
݉ሺܣሻ ൌ 	 ∑ ݉ଵሺܺሻ ∗ ݉ଶሺܻሻ௑∩௒ୀ஺1 െ ∑ ݉ଵሺܺሻ ∗ ݉ଶሺܻሻ௑∩௒ୀ∅ 			∀	ܣ ് ∅								ሺ1ሻ 
Among different data fusion methods, the D-S theory of ev-
idence has been chosen in this work for three main reasons. 
Firstly, D-S is able to combine evidence from multiple and 
heterogeneous sources. Second, D-S is suitable for detecting 
previously unseen attacks because it does not require a priori 
knowledge. Finally, and more importantly, the D-S provides 
the ability of managing and assigning probability to {A|N} = 
Uncertainty, which allows tackling a large range of problems. 
The authors in [5, 12] present a comparative study of dif-
ferent data fusion methods. This work concludes that D-S theo-
ry is more promising than Bayesian inference. Bayesian ap-
proach provides a powerful method to provide final conclu-
sions. However, this method requires complete knowledge of 
the conditional probabilities of all of the used metrics and spec-
ification of the a priori probability distribution of the different 
hypotheses. This last requirement is unfeasible in many appli-
cations [18]. Additionally, the Bayesian method does not allow 
allocation of probability to Uncertainty but only to the hypoth-
eses Normal or Attack [13]. 
IV. BELIEF GENERATOR MECHANISMS 
The principal distinctive features of the proposed method 
are the light profiling process, the capability to automatically 
generate BPAs based on the measured traffic network charac-
teristics, and the high detection accuracy and low number of 
false alarms that it produces. The dataset used for profiling the 
system is as little as 20 network frames. 
Figure 1.   Sliding window scheme. 
We propose three different methodologies for assigning the 
belief to each hypothesis of Θ, 2Θ = {Attack, Normal, Uncer-
tainty, Ø}. One method generates the belief in Attack, and a 
second method generates the belief in Normal. Both work con-
currently. Then, based on the belief in Normal and Attack, a 
third method calculates a balanced belief in Uncertainty. 
Two conditions must be assured. First, the number of legal 
frames must be larger than the malicious frames. Normal data 
is more predominant than malicious data in real network traffic 
[14]. Second, the difference between metrics of legal and mali-
cious frames must be statistically differentiable and quantifia-
ble. Regarding the first assumption, we have tested scenarios in 
which the proposed system performs with high detection rate 
even if there are malicious frames in the initial profiling set. 
Before being able to identify any attack, the IDSs need to 
define what is considered as normal traffic. In the case where 
the majority of frames in the initial window are malicious, the 
detection mechanism would misclassify. A longer window 
would prevent this situation as it would include a larger propor-
tion of legal frames and the statistics would average out to rep-
resent a normal profile. However, there is a trade off between 
the lightness of profiling and the chances of misclassification. 
The proposed system operates on a sliding window scheme 
using incoming frames from the legal client. The content of the 
݊  frames within the sliding window composes the profiling 
dataset of the system, every time a new frame is analysed. For 
each new incoming frame, different metrics are extracted. The 
system has one sliding window for each used metric. The sta-
tistical mean of the metrics is used as a reference of normality 
for the method to assign the beliefs proposed below. 
The length ݊ of the sliding window will influence the over-
all detection performance of the system. In our experiments, 
we have used ݊ ൌ 20 frames for generating the mean. We have 
experimentally proved that 20 frames are appropriate to make 
an accurate detection. However, due to space restrictions the 
results are not presented in this work. 
In order to avoid malicious frames altering the reference of 
normality, the system slides the window only if the current 
analysed frame has been classified as legal. Otherwise, the slid-
ing window stays static, drops the frame classified as malicious 
and replaces the last slot in the sliding window with the next 
incoming frame. Fig.1 represents an example in which the 20th 
frame has been classified as malicious and the sliding window 
stays static, only replacing the malicious frame. 
A. Method to Assign Belief in Attack 
The methodology that we propose assigns beliefs in Attack 
based on two factors, the Euclidean distance of the current 
frame from the mean, and frequency of the data. The system 
calculates an angle ߙ with the distance and the frequency, in 
order to correlate both factors. 
Let us consider a dataset of length ݊ ൌ 20. The system cal-
culates the highest number of times that a metric is repeated, or 
frequency ሺܨሻ, for the ݊ elements in the dataset, and the mean. 
Then, the system calculates the angle α generated by the fre-
quency and the value with the largest Euclidean distance 
ሺܦ௠௔௫ሻ from the mean, as represented in Fig.2. This angle α 
represents the maximum possible belief in Attack. 
For each new incoming frame, the system calculates the 
angle β generated by ܨ and the distance ሺܦሻ of this value from 
the mean. The angle β would be bounded by 0 and α, 0 ≤ β ≤ α. 
Due to the way D-S theory and the BPA are assigned in our 
methodology, the maximum possible belief in both, Normal 
and Attack, is set to 50%. 
ߚ ൌ cosିଵ ൭ ܨ
ሺܦଶ ൅ ܨଶሻଵଶ
൱																										ሺ2ሻ 
Using a simple linear function, the system assigns the belief 
in Attack. The minimum belief in Attack, 0%, is defined by the 
angle 0 radians. 
B. Method to Assign Belief in Normal 
The methodology that we propose assigns beliefs in Nor-
mal, based on the degree of dispersion of the values in the da-
taset. The system makes use of quartiles to create classes with-
in the dataset and assigns a fixed belief to each of class. 
Let us consider a dataset of length ݊ ൌ 20, sorted in an as-
cending way. From this sorted dataset, the first quartile ሺܳଵሻ 
will define the boundary for the lower 25% of the data, the 
second quartile, or median ሺܯ݁ሻ, will define the boundary for 
the 50% of the data, and the third quartile ሺܳଷሻ will define the 
boundary for the lower 75% of the data. 
Similar to the process used with the method ‘box and 
whisker’ [15], the ܯ݅݊ and ܯܽݔ values are respectively calcu-
lated through the following equations: 
ܯ݅݊ ൌ ܳଵ െ 1,5	 ൈ ܫܴܳ																													ሺ3ሻ 
ܯܽݔ ൌ ܳଷ ൅ 1,5	 ൈ ܫܴܳ																													ሺ4ሻ 
whereas, the Interquartile Range (IQR) is the difference be-
tween ܳଷ and ܳଵ. 
Figure 2.  BPA method for belief in Attack. 
Figure 3.  BPA scale for belief in Normal. 
The metrics of each new incoming frame is allocated within 
one of the classes. Depending on the class that the current 
frame is allocated to, the system assigns the belief in Normal. 
Fig.3 illustrates the different classes and the belief value as-
sociated to each of them. If the value of current frame coin-
cides with ܯ݁, the belief is 50%. If the value is allocated be-
tween the ܳଵ and ܯ݁, or ܳଷ and ܯ݁, the belief in Normal is 
40%. Values between ܯ݅݊ and ܳଵ, or ܳଷ and ܯܽݔ will acquire 
belief of 30%. The rest of the values will acquire belief of 15% 
in Normal. 
C. Method to Assign Belief in Uncertainty 
Based on the outcome of the two previous methods, the 
proposed methodology assigns beliefs in Uncertainty. The Un-
certainty is considered in this work as an adjustment parameter. 
The outcome of the two previous methods could provide 
four different conclusions: 1) High belief in Attack and high 
belief in Normal. 2) Low belief in Attack and high belief in 
Normal. 3) High belief in Attack and low belief in Normal. 4) 
Low belief in Attack and belief in Normal. For the cases 2 and 
3, both methods have reached similar conclusions. Hence, it is 
expected that the belief in Uncertainty must be low. In contrast, 
in the cases 1 and 4, both methods have reached contradictory 
conclusions, therefore the expected belief in Uncertainty must 
be high. 
We propose the following method for assigning the belief 
in Uncertainty. First, a provisional value is assigned to Uncer-
tainty using a linear correlation between the belief in Normal 
and Attack. As mentioned above, the maximum possible belief 
corresponds to 0.5. So, for calculating the belief in Uncertainty, 
the larger of both beliefs, Normal and Attack, is adjusted to 
50%. For instance, if the belief in Normal and Attack are 0.4 
and 0.497, respectively, the value for Uncertainty would be: 
ܤ݈݁݅݁ ௎݂௡௖. ൌ 0.5 ∗ 0.4/0.497 ൌ 0.402. 
In this example, the summation of all the beliefs is higher 
than 1. This breaks one of the conditions in the definition of 
BPA by the D-S theory: ∑ ݉	ሺܣሻ ൌ 1஺	⊆	஀  
Therefore, an adjustment value ߤ is calculated as follows: 
ߤ ൌ ሺܺ െ 1ሻ/3																																										ሺ5ሻ 
where ܺ is the summation of the three beliefs. Continuing 
with the previous example, ܺ ൌ 0.4 ൅ 0.497 ൅ 0.402 ൌ 1.22. 
Then, the adjustment value is ߤ ൌ ሺ1.229 െ 1ሻ/3 ൌ 0.099 . 
Therefore, the beliefs in Normal, Attack and Uncertainty are 
readjusted to 0.3, 0.397 and 0.303, respectively. 
V. SYSTEM METHODOLOGY 
For the purpose of this work, we have tested our proposed 
approach in an IEEE 802.11 network composed of four differ-
ent parties. These are an Access Point (AP), a monitoring node 
utilising the TShark [17] software for collecting frames, an 
attacker, and a client associated with the AP, accessing various 
websites hosted on the Internet across different geographical 
locations. The fact that the attacker was placed very close to 
the AP, around 1.5 meters away, may degrade the detection 
accuracy. The monitoring node is responsible for performing 
the proposed intrusion detection. When the monitoring node 
captures any frame destined to the client, TShark identifies and 
isolates the respective metrics of each frame. Then, the gath-
ered dataset is passed to the data fusion process to be analysed. 
The monitoring node and the attacker were running Linux and 
all the devices except from the Linksys WRT54GL AP used 
the Atheros chipset in their wireless cards. 
A. Metrics 
We have generated our own IEEE 802.11 dataset for the 
development and assessment of this work. The captured frames 
are stored in pcap format. Among all the available metrics, four 
have been experimentally selected as the most appropriate for 
detecting the attacks. These are the Received Signal Strength 
Indication (RSSI) at the PHY layer, the Injection Rate and the 
Network Allocation Vector (NAV) value at the MAC layer, 
and the Time To Live (TTL) value at the Network layer. 
Due to the fact that management and control frames include 
only information from the PHY and MAC layers in which TTL 
is not included, in the deauthentication experiments TTL has 
been replaced by the Delta Time (ΔTime) value. The ΔTime is 
defined as the time difference between two consecutive frames. 
B. Attacks Description 
1) Man-in-the-Midle Attack 
The presented methodology has been tested with two dif-
ferent types of MitM attacks at the PHY layer. The MitM at-
tacks were implemented by the Airpwn tool. Firstly, Airpwn 
spoofs the AP MAC address. Then, it listens for legal requests 
from the client and injects its own crafted HTML code. In the 
first type (Attack01), the attacker replaces the whole content of 
the website. In the second type (Attack02) the attacker replaces 
only the images in the website. Both could cause harm of vary-
ing severity, i.e. redirect the client to a phishing website. 
2) Deauthentication Attack 
Another type of attack that has been investigated is the 
deauthentication of wireless clients from the legal AP. This 
type of attack is commonly utilised in DoS attacks but consists 
also the first step for breaking into WPA2 encrypted wireless 
networks. In the latter case, the attacker injects a few spoofed 
deauthentication frames with the purpose of forcing the client 
to re-establish a connection with the AP. At a later stage and 
off-line, the attacker could succeed in cracking WPA2 by ap-
plying brute force or dictionary attack techniques. The suite of 
tools used to implement this attack is Aircrack. 
The detection of the deauthentication attack was possible 
just by using management and control frames for two reasons. 
Firstly, deauthentication attacks are highly correlated with in-
formation in the management frames. Furthermore, because the 
network was encrypted with WPA2, and with the assumption 
that the monitor node does not have the key, it was not possible 
or necessary to retrieve information above the MAC layer. 
VI. RESULTS 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed meth-
odology, the results from the multi-layer scheme are compared 
against the same methodology, but utilising fewer metrics. All 
cases have been evaluated with the same gathered dataset. 
The results are evaluated by comparing the FN, FP and the 
Detection Rate (DR). These are: 
ܦܴ ൌ ܶܲ/ሺܶܲ ൅ ܨܰሻ																															ሺ6ሻ 
ܨܰ ൌ ܨܰ/ሺܶܲ ൅ ܨܰሻ																														ሺ7ሻ 
ܨܲ ൌ ܨܲ/ሺܶܲ ൅ ܨܲ ൅ ܶܰ ൅ ܨܰሻ																			ሺ8ሻ 
Also, IDSs are commonly evaluated by the Overall Success 
Rate (OSR) and the F-Score [16]. OSR is defined by: 
ܱܴܵ ൌ ሺܶܲ ൅ ܶܰሻ/ሺܶܲ ൅ ܨܲ ൅ ܶܰ ൅ ܨܰሻ									ሺ9ሻ 
The F-Score is a tradeoff between the Precision (Pr), the 
number of correct detections among all the frames classified as 
attack, and the DR. The higher the F-Score, the better the Pre-
cision and the DR [16]. 
ܨܵܿ݋ݎ݁ ൌ ሺ2 ∗ ܲݎ ∗ ܦܴሻ/ሺܲݎ ൅ ܦܴሻ														ሺ10ሻ 
where ܲݎ ൌ ܶܲ/ሺܶܲ ൅ ܨܲሻ. 
A. MitM attack Results 
The multi-layer results for the MitM attack experiments, 
using the four considered metrics, are presented in Table I. As 
can be appreciated, the detection results are almost perfect, 
generating less than 0.1% of FP in two cases. These FPs are 
caused because the analysed metrics of the legal frames deviate 
from what is considered as normal traffic. This leads to a high 
belief in Attack and low belief in Normal. 
As a showcasing example of the detection performance 
when less metrics are employed, the set of three metrics RSSI-
Inj.Rate-TTL has been selected. In this case (Table II), the re-
sults of FPs and FNs are slightly higher than the previous one. 
The combination of dual metric RSSI and TTL (Table IV) 
presents higher number of FP overall compared with the results 
above, exceeding 14% of FP in three cases. Additionally, two 
cases present FNs, deteriorating the detection performance, 
exceeding 1% of FNs in one case. 
As an indicative example of the detection performance with 
a single metric, the results of single metric RSSI (Table VI) 
have been chosen. The detection accuracy decreases drastically 
when the single metric method is used, reaching 23.5% of FN 
in one case, and exceeding 25% of FP in three cases. 
Finally, the use of Inj. Rate metric dominates the results. In 
fact, the utilisation of Inj. Rate results in perfect detection, with 
100% of DR and 0% of FP (Table V). The dominance of this 
metric in such cases can be explained due to the used injection 
tools. These tools inject frames fixed at 1 Mbps. This makes 
Inj. Rate a crucial metric to consider for detecting injection of 
attack frame. 
Assuming injection-based attacking tools get enhanced and 
manage to adapt their rate to that of legal frames, without sig-
nificant drop in their performance, the presented methodology 
will still perform with high DR and low numbers of FP and 
FN. This can be seen in Table III, in which RSSI-NAV-TTL 
are employed without considering Inj. Rate. 
Because of space limitations, the results for the rest of met-
rics combinations are not shown. However, the performances 
of these cases are very similar to the cases just presented. 
TABLE I.  MULTI-LAYER RESULTS UTILISING RSSI, INJECTION RATE, 
TTL AND NAV 
Type DR (%) FN (%) FP (%) OSR F-Score 
Normal n/a n/a 0.01 1 n/a 
Atck01 100 0 0.08 1 0.99 
Atck02 100 0 0 1 1 
Atck02- Atck01 100 0 0 1 1 
TABLE II.  TRIPLE METRIC RESULTS USING RSSI, INJ. RATE AND TTL 
Type DR (%) FN (%) FP (%) OSR F-Score 
Normal n/a n/a 0.76 0.99 n/a 
Atck01 100 0 1.79 0.98 0.76 
Atck02 100 0 0.86 0.99 0.92 
Atck02- Atck01 99.5 0.5 0.87 0.99 0.78 
TABLE III.  TRIPLE METRIC RESULTS UTILISING RSSI, TTL AND NAV 
Type DR (%) FN (%) FP (%) OSR F-Score 
Normal n/a n/a 0.77 0.99 n/a 
Atck01 100 0 1.96 0.98 0.74 
Atck02 100 0 0.86 0.99 0.92 
Atck02- Atck01 99.5 0.5 0.93 0.99 0.77 
TABLE IV.  DUAL METRIC RESULTS UTILISING TTL AND RSSI 
Type DR (%) FN (%) FP (%) OSR F-Score 
Normal n/a n/a 8.84 0.91 n/a 
Atck01 100 0 17.28 0.83 0.24 
Atck02 99.87 0.13 17.81 0.82 0.37 
Atck02- Atck01 98.99 1.01 14.03 0.86 0.18 
TABLE V.  SINGLE METRIC RESULTS UTILISING INJECTION RATE 
Type DR (%) FN (%) FP (%) OSR F-Score 
Normal n/a n/a 0 1 n/a 
Atck01 100 0 0 1 1 
Atck02 100 0 0 1 1 
Atck02- Atck01 100 0 0 1 1 
TABLE VI.  SINGLE METRIC RESULTS UTILISING RSSI 
Type DR (%) FN (%) FP (%) OSR F-Score 
Normal n/a n/a 28.99 0.71 n/a 
Atck01 76.47 23.53 17.77 0.81 0.19 
Atck02 97.35 2.65 25.19 0.75 0.28 
Atck02- Atck01 96.98 3.02 27.34 0.73 0.1 
 
B. Deauthentication attack Results 
As explained in Section V, the communication between the 
client and the AP was protected with WPA2 and a pre-shared 
key. Even though the system utilises metrics from just the two 
lower layers of the TCP/IP stack, the presented methodology 
was able to detect the deauthentication attack. 
The multi-layer results for the deauthentication attack ex-
periments, using the four considered metrics, are presented in 
Fig.4. As can be appreciated, these are the best results overall 
in detecting the attacks. The detection system generates 0% of 
FN and 6% of FP. Similar to the experiments with MitM at-
tack, the FPs are caused because the analysed metrics of the 
malicious frames are very close to the legal frames. 
In contrast to the experiments with MitM attack, the metric 
Inj.Rate is ineffective in detecting the deauthentication attack. 
This is because management frame, both legal and malicious, 
are transmitted at a fixed rate of 1 Mbps. As can be seen in 
Fig.4, the use of Inj.Rate degrades the DR results of all the 
possible metric combinations. However, when using the four 
metric multi-layer approach, the use of Inj.Rate preservers high 
DR and does not degrade the results in terms of FN. 
In addition, the use of Inj.Rate benefits the results because 
it reduces the number of FPs. In particular, the use of RSSI-
ΔTime-NAV produces 0% of FNs but 14.35% of FPs. When 
including the Inj.Rate, the number of FPs is reduced to 6.33%. 
Figure 4.  Deauthentication Attack Results. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper tackles an important step that remains open in 
the use of D-S theory in network security infrastructures, find-
ing an automatic and self-adaptive process of Basic Probability 
Assignment. The authors of this work have proposed and eval-
uated a novel BPA methodology able to automatically adapt its 
detection capabilities to the current characteristics of the wire-
less network, without intervention from an IDS administrator 
for selecting thresholds or manually/experimentally assigning 
beliefs. The system only requires a light profiling process of 20 
frames. An analysis is carried out a per frame bases. 
The proposed methodology has been evaluated with real 
WiFi data traffic in our test-bed environment. Two different 
types of attack have been investigated, a MitM attack and a 
Deauthentication attack. In order to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the proposed methodology, the results from the multi-layer 
methodology are compared against the same methodology, but 
utilising metrics from fewer layers. 
As explained throughout this work, using the proposed 
methodology, there exist some attacks that can be easily de-
tected by utilising the information from one single metric. For 
instance, Inj.Rate provides perfect results in detecting both 
types of MitM attacks. However, using solely the Inj.Rate met-
ric for detecting a deauthentication attack would be completely 
ineffective. In both attacks scenarios, the combination of in-
formation from all the metrics produces the best results overall 
in detecting malicious injected frames. By considering these 
results, it is clear that the proposed manner of intelligent com-
bination of beliefs from different metrics yields an improved 
performance, in terms of detection rate and false alarms. 
As for future work, we will investigate methods to automat-
ically select the most appropriate metrics for detecting each 
attack taking place. This will help to reduce the number of false 
alarms and towards better mitigation techniques. Finally, the 
proposed technique can be installed in multiple monitors that 
could collaboratively work for achieving higher DR. 
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